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The financial legal status of local governments varies widely in time and space, as this 
system of governance is continuously changing and developing. The realization of 
financial independence needs a number of public financing instruments which can be 
present in various forms depending on the nature of the system. It is obvious that we 
cannot separate the municipal financial issues from the central government’s budget 
given that these are closely linked to each other through the financial connections 
between the layers of governance. Thanks to the changes in this dynamic, this topic is 
always current in financial legal circles and among economists, public finance 
specialists and experts dealing with this problematic issue. This is even more the case 
during periods of time when cross-border effects produce important reform processes.  
This paper focuses on several fundamental issues. What is the reason for providing 
certain types of public services at the local level? What are the financial sources that 
the local management of public services should consist of? Who should finance them? 
To what extent should the central government intervene in these issues? What are the 
effects of the new system introduced in Hungary in the early 2010s?  
 
The detailed description of fiscal federalism and its first-generation theories enables us 
to see that the units of local government have an important role in providing public 
services. Thus, the financial decentralization is constantly a current issue.2 I tried to 
classify the relevant theories to be able to demonstrate the pros and cons of financial 
decentralization.  
Local interests, the concept of a more direct democracy, the problems related to 
information and data, Tiebout's hypothesis, Oates' decentralization theorem, the cost-
effectiveness and the Leviathan hypothesis favor decentralisation3. But there are a lot of 
arguments against decentralisation: for example, the spill over effects, economies of 
scale, the fiscal illusion, the so-called club goods, the flypaper effect, as well as critiques 
of Tiebout's hypothesis.4 After having studied these aspects5, it has become obvious that 
the conclusions drawn on financial federalism are not limited to federal states: instead, 
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they can prove useful and applicable on the different layers of governance in unitary 
states too. 
It is worth examining how different systems of local governance have changed 
throughout the last decade, especially in reaction to the financial crisis. 
Table 1 
Subnational Government Structure and Finance in Europe (2015) 
 
Measure 
Expenditure 
as a 
percentage of 
GDP 
Revenue as a 
percentage of 
GDP 
Debt as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
Local tax 
revenue as 
a 
percentage 
of GDP 
Country 
Federations and 
quasi-federations 
  Austria 17,9 18 12,7 1,7 
  Belgium 26,6 25,3 20,9 5,7 
  Germany 20,8 21,1 28 11,8 
  Spain 21,9 20,6 32,2 8,1 
Unitary countries   Czech Republic 11,4 12 4,1 5 
  Denmark 34,9 35,2 11,1 12,3 
  Estonia 9,5 9,7 4,4 0,3 
  Finland 23 23 12,7 10,4 
  France 11,4 11,5 11,1 5,7 
  Greece 3,4 3,7 1,2 0,9 
  Hungary 7,9 8,1 0,6 2,3 
  Iceland 13 12,4 13,2 9,4 
  Ireland 2,2 2,5 2,1 0,5 
  Italy 14,5 14,8 11,4 6,4 
  Latvia 9,3 9,6 7,6 5,6 
  Luxembourg 4,6 5 2,6 1,3 
  Netherlands 14,5 14,1 11,5 1,4 
  Norway 16,1 15,7 17,1 5,9 
  Poland 12,8 12,8 5,5 4,2 
  Portugal 5,9 6,4 7,8 2,5 
  Slovak Republic 7,5 7,6 3 0,5 
  Slovenia 9 9,3 3,2 3,5 
  Sweden 25 24,8 16,1 13,3 
  United Kingdom 10,9 10,6 10,3 1,6 
OECD Total   16,4 16 24,4 7 
EU28 Total   15,7 15,6 15,6 6,2 
 Source: Author compiled, based on the data of the OECD 
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Analysing the development of these systems (of local governance), it may be 
established that the Anglo-Saxon and continental methods of governance serving as 
models can, in their pure form, only exist in theory. They cannot exist in practice because 
they have been subject to important changes affecting primarily their financial autonomy 
and the provision of local services. Regarding the data collected by the OECD in 2015, 
I can conclude that the ratio of local expenses to GDP stagnated or increased in the 
majority of the examined countries (see Table 1). There are two exceptions: Hungary 
and Ireland, where we can witness a considerable fall as the expenses of local 
governments decreased by 75%. 
It must be mentioned – as emphasized by a 2010 report of the European Commission 
– that local governments were faced with the necessity of layoffs, structural 
reorganization and borrowing in the wake of the financial difficulties (and especially the 
decrease in income) caused by the crisis.6 
In my opinion, the sub-national levels of government, the public services provided at 
these levels and the trends in the organization and financing of public services (e.g.: 
decentralization and centralization) all show a cyclical process, even in the context of 
diverse and differing international practices.  
 
In Hungary, the system of local and regional authorities established during the 
democratic transition has been working, changing and developing for more than 20 years 
until it has undergone a process of significant transformation in the early 2010s. This 
change affected the scope of local public services as well as the main character of local 
governments. A certain number of services that were formerly provided locally have 
been centralized. Regulations on local management have been changed. Numerous 
checks and limits have been installed in the system. The revenue structure has been 
transformed and the system of intergovernmental grants and transfers has been reshaped.  
We can clearly see that the solution was not entirely effective given that several other 
factors contributed to the aforementioned errors. For example, the tasks conferred to 
local levels were not accompanied by changes in the financing system. The system could 
not cope with the difficulty resulting from the fact that the resources of individual local 
governments varied widely but they all had the same legal status. The revised system of 
revenue assignment is a good example of the new approach called “task-based” 
financing (an expenditure-oriented system replacing the previous resource-based 
financing) – including its negative aspects. 
The evaluation and assessment of these changes is controversial. We are faced with 
a large number of arguments and counterarguments concerning the considerations of 
experts in the fields of administrative law, financial law and public finances. This is 
precisely the reason why we cannot disregard the exemplary practices and achievements 
of the previous revenue assignment system, even if there are a lot of negative aspects.  
I could conclude that the original objective of the preparation of this revised concept 
was not to introduce the current system but to provide a much-needed correction to the 
system of financing of public services based on the calculations on expenditure needs 
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detailed above. In the end, it is clear that while the terminology remains unchanged, the 
contents of the system have been transformed completely after the adoption of the new 
Local Government Act in 2011 and its amendment. The reason for the divergence from 
the original objective could be that some key issues with the proposed solution were 
obvious from the beginning. For example, it is very time consuming, difficult and 
expensive to determine the expenditure requirements of local municipalities. From these 
observations, it can be concluded that this approach to the financing of public services 
is not the same solution as similarly named approaches in international literature.7  
The role and the financing of local governments across Europe has changed due to 
the economic crisis, meaning that the relationship between local and central governance 
needed to be rethought. This is not exclusively a Hungarian trend. In the background of 
the reorganization of the provision of public services among the different layers of 
governance, there is a sort of centralisation as a desired objective to achieve. This is 
present also in the financing of public services. 
The impact of the new approaches is detectable in the financial system. Local 
expenditures have decreased by 7.9% relative to GDP because of the centralisation of 
providing public services (see Table 1).8 This is due to the fact that primary education, 
personal social benefits and health care have been handed over to the central 
government. The central management of local services has also resulted in the reduction 
of local autonomy. Together with the change in financing, the scope of powers delegated 
to the different levels of government, as laid down by law, has also changed in Hungary. 
Interestingly, in practice, this division of powers shows a very different picture. 
Therefore, there are several services that are traditionally considered “local government-
related” which can also be provided in a centralized way without them losing their local 
character.  
 
*** 
 
During the transition period, the objective was the decentralization of centralized power 
in order to put local administrative units in a more powerful position.  
In the 2010s a sort of reversal process has begun unfolding which enhances the 
centralization of local public services according to a concept of the state as a “good 
owner”. Due to the changes in the financing of local authorities and the regulation of 
local governments there are a number of new limits, checks and instruments for 
stabilization curtailing the extent of locally administered functions. This process leads 
us to question whether the local government is actually independent.9  
Numerous local taxes have become earmarked after 2010. As local taxation is of the 
most important elements of local financial autonomy, this intervention in their free use 
can cause harm to local interests. By the same logic, in the case of support by the central 
government, the use of non-earmarked subsidies can reinforce local financial autonomy. 
As formulated by József Hegedűs and Gábor Péteri, this transformation process was 
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entirely contrary to the logic of the functioning of local financing and local public 
services, eliminating the positive results achieved during the past few decades.10 
On one hand, overregulated financial solutions make the system more inflexible and 
on the other hand, they decrease the need of savings on a local level. In my viewpoint, 
local governance is a democratic value. It represents more than the local dimension of 
public services. It is the representation of local interests and it is one of the cornerstones 
of the development of communities. 
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